Correlation with Time Explains the Relationship between Survey Nonresponse and Mass Polarization by Mellon, Jonathan & Prosser, Christopher
1 
  
Correlation with Time Explains the Relationship between Survey Nonresponse and 
Mass Polarization 
 
Short title: Survey Nonresponse and Mass Polarization 
 
Authors 
Jonathan Mellon, University of Manchester 
Christopher Prosser, University of Manchester 
 
  





 While elite polarization in US politics has been well established, there has been substantial 
debate about whether US mass opinion has polarized in recent decades. Cavari and Freedman (2018) 
suggest the apparent polarization of the US public may in part be an artifact of declining survey 
response rates. Cavari and Freedman argue that declining response rates may have led to only the 
most politicized—and therefore polarized—respondents being willing to give their opinions. We 
argue that, while the mechanism posited is plausible, other theoretical models of nonresponse 
predict no change in nonresponse bias or even declining nonresponse bias, depending on the cause of 
increased nonresponse. We show that the results of Cavari and Freedman’s analysis are spuriously 
driven by each variable’s correlation with time. After accounting for the time correlation there is no 
evidence that nonresponse bias has inflated estimates of mass polarization. 
Keywords: survey nonresponse, survey bias, public opinion, polarization, political 
engagement. 




In a recent article, Cavari and Freedman (2018) (henceforth, CF) argue that the apparent 
polarization of US mass opinion is exaggerated by declining survey response rates. As survey 
response rates declined, they argue, the composition of survey respondents changed, with only the 
most politicized—and therefore polarized—citizens being willing to give their opinions. In other 
words, declining response rates increased nonresponse bias when measuring polarization. We argue 
that, while the mechanism posited by CF seems initially plausible, alternative theoretical models 
predict stable or declining nonresponse bias when response rates decline. The results of CF’s 
analysis are spuriously driven by each variable’s independent correlation with time. When we take 
correlation with time into account, we find no evidence that declining response rates have inflated 
levels of polarization. Additionally, when we use a measure of fieldwork effort in the American 
National Election Studies (ANES) time series dataset to simulate the effect of declining response 
rates on polarization from 1980-2016, we find no evidence that lower response rates would have 
changed conclusions about polarization. 
Nonresponse bias and polarization 
The idea that mass polarization might be partially an artifact of differential nonresponse 
seems plausible at face value. It is well established that surveys over-represent politically interested 
respondents (Groves, Presser and Dipko, 2004; Keeter et al., 2006; Tourangeau, Groves and Redline, 
2010; Mellon and Prosser, 2017), and other research has shown that politically interested 
respondents are more polarized (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). If lower response rates have 
increased nonresponse bias,i it seems plausible that lower response rates might result in more 
polarized survey responses. 
However, lower response rates do not automatically translate into higher levels of survey error 
(Curtin, Presser and Singer, 2000, 2005; Keeter et al., 2006) and it is not clear that lower survey 
response rates have resulted in increased nonresponse bias. For example, Martinez (2003) showed 
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the apparently widening gap (Burden, 2000) between official turnout and turnout in the ANES was 
attributable to using the incorrect turnout benchmark and the ANES’s adoption of panel surveys. 
More recently, Prosser and Mellon (2018) show a stable gap between reported and actual turnout in 
British Election Study data despite declining response rates. Additionally, while declining response 
rates fit well with rising mass polarization in the US, other countries show various trends in mass 
polarization (e.g. Knutsen, 1998) despite uniformly falling response rates around the world. 
To demonstrate that declining response rates do not necessarily increase nonresponse bias, we 
formalize two theoretical models of survey nonresponse. One way to formalize CF’s theory is to see 
nonresponse as a simple function of political interest and random noise. If the sum of the noise and 
interest exceed a threshold, a respondent answers the survey. However, a problem with this model is 
that a significant proportion of the recent increase in survey nonresponse has occurred before 
potential respondents could find out what the survey topic was: potential survey respondents have 
stopped answering their phones (Kohut et al., 2012). Our second model of nonresponse sees survey 
response as a two-stage process—first potential respondents must answer their phones, and second, 
those who do answer their phones must agree to take part in the survey. Declining contact rates 
have been attributed to things that have nothing to do with political interest, such as increased cold-
calling and robo-calls, and the adoption of caller ID (Prosser and Mellon, 2018). Although we do 
not know what determines why—given largely uniform exposure to nuisance calling—some people 
answer their phones to unknown numbers and others do not, a plausible mechanism is that some 
kinds of traits vary across individuals making some willing to answer their phones and surveys in 
general. We refer to such traits collectively as prosociality.ii Crucially, because prosociality is likely to 
affect response at both stages, the propensity to respond at the two stages is correlated, and 
response rates can decline either by increasing the threshold for response at the contact stage or by 
increasing the threshold for response conditional on having been contacted. 
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Using these models, we simulate the effect of nonresponse bias for polarization and show that 
it can increase, stay stable, or even decrease depending on the cause of declining response rates. We 
report the simulations in detail in the appendix along with formal descriptions of our models but 
summarize the results here. First, our simulations show that if response rates fall by increasing the 
participation threshold, we see an artefactual increase in polarization, in line with CF’s argument. 
Second, when we simulate a decline in response rates driven by an increase in the threshold for 
respondents at the first stage, falling response rates actually reduce nonresponse bias for mass 
polarization. This is because some people, whose high political interest would overcome their lack of 
prosociality if they knew the topic of the survey, are filtered out at the contact stage, before their 
political interest can play a role. By contrast, a stronger first stage filter tends to remove low interest 
people who would otherwise have dropped out after they heard the topic of the survey. Low interest 
respondents who make it past the initial pickup filter are disproportionately prosocial and therefore 
conditionally more likely to take part in the survey at the second stage. Importantly, all our 
simulations suggest falling response rates could increase nonresponse bias for prosociality-related 
variables which correlate with response at both stages. Future research should examine whether data 
on social trust or political trust are biased by nonresponse. 
These simulations are not intended to disprove CF’s argument. However, they show that we 
should not have strong theoretical expectations that the effect of declining response rates on 
nonresponse bias runs in a particular direction. The adequacy of the empirical analysis is therefore of 
central importance to whether there is evidence for CF’s proposed mechanism.  
Survey polarization and spurious correlations  
The central evidence CF present is an analysis of the relationship between the survey 
response rate and partisan polarization for a series of questions asked in Pew surveys between 2004 
and 2014. CF operationalize partisan polarization as the absolute Cohen’s D coefficient of mean 
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differences between Republican and Democrat respondents’ answers to each question.iii CF group 
the questions into six policy areas (economy, energy, immigration, civil rights, welfare, and foreign 
policy) and model each area separately (with the survey as the unit of analysis), controlling for 
congressional polarization. 
 
Figure 1. Response rate and dependent variables in Cavari and Freedman’s analysis of Pew data over time 
 
CF report statistically significant negative relationships (i.e. lower response rates are 
associated with more polarization) between response rate and polarization for the economy, energy, 
and immigration, no relationship for civil rights and welfare (which CF argue attest to the fact that 
these are longstanding areas of partisan disagreement), and a positive relationship (i.e. lower 
response rates associated with less polarization) for foreign policy.iv  
A potential problem of this model is that it does not take into account the time series nature 
of the data. Time series data can generate spurious correlations because, as Wooldridge (2009, p. 
360) succinctly describes: “In many cases, two time series processes appear to be correlated only 
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because they are both trending over time for reasons related to other unobserved factors.”. This can 
occur even if two processes are generated by independent random walks (Granger and Newbold, 
1974). Analogous problems to spurious correlation appear when pooled models are used to examine 
time series cross-sectional data without accounting for trends or unit roots (Lebo and Weber, 2015). 
When we examine CF’s data, several key variables are clearly correlated with time. Figure 1 plots the 
response rate and polarization measures for each of the six policy areas against the year the survey 
was conducted (along with the linear fit between time and each variable on the plot). Survey 
response rates declined substantially over this period. The changes over time for polarization look 
less dramatic but show polarization on the economy, energy, and immigration increased, remained 
flat for civil rights and welfare, and declined for foreign policy. The results show that response rate is 
highly correlated with time (R2 = .93). This strong correlation with time means that survey response 
rate is likely to be correlated with other variables that are correlated with time, even if they are 
causally unrelated. We also see statistically significant positive time terms for economy, energy, and 
immigration, no significant time effects for civil rights and welfare, and a significant negative 
relationship with time for foreign policy.v If there was no causal relationship between response rate 
and polarization, because they are both correlated with time, we would expect to see (spurious) 
negative correlations between response rate, and economy, energy, and immigration, no correlations 
between response rate, and civil rights and welfare, and a positive correlation between response rate 
and foreign policy, a pattern that matches CF’s findings exactly. 
Given the potential problem of spurious correlations between variables because they are 
both correlated with time, we cannot take the results of CF’s model at face value. To address this 
problem, we build on CF’s model in a number of ways. First, we add a linear year term (Wooldridge, 
2009), second, we specify a semiparametric model with a nonparametric year function, third, we add 
year fixed effects, and fourth, we add year random intercepts with mean response rate by year 
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included as a covariate.vi See appendix for the full specifications.  
Table 1 shows the results of these analyses.vii The first set of models replicates CF’s original 
analysis and shows three issue areas with a statistically significant negative relationship between mass 
polarization and unit response rate: economy, energy, and immigration, and one issue area with a 
positive relationship between mass polarization and unit response rate: foreign policy. 
Once we include a linear time term, all the negative relationships are no longer statistically 
significant and the coefficients reverse their signs. The one positive relationship found in the original 
analysis (foreign policy) dramatically shrinks in size and is no longer statistically significant. One 
issue area, welfare, where no relationship was apparent in the original analysis becomes statistically 
significant and positively related to response rate. The semiparametric models produce nearly 
identical results. For both the fixed effects and HLM models, none of the models have statistically 
significant coefficients, including welfare, suggesting that the statistically significant positive 
coefficients for welfare in the linear and semiparametric models are also likely to be spurious. 
Table 1 Regression models of polarization with and without time controls 
Time term control Economy Energy Immigration Civil Rights Welfare Foreign Policy 
None (CF’s approach) -0.0130*** -0.0172*** -0.0169*** -0.000337 -0.000182 0.0172*** 
 (0.00382) (0.00430) (0.00352) (0.00250) (0.00535) (0.00210) 
       
Linear 0.0113 0.00653 0.00818 0.0113 0.0431** 0.00753 
 (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.00923) (0.0158) (0.00922) 
       
Semiparametric 0.0121 0.00361 0.00804 0.0119 0.0588** 0.00486 
 (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0180) (0.0102) 
       
Year fixed effects 0.00322 -0.00615 -0.0159 0.00623 0.0327 0.00594 
 (0.0203) (0.0133) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0218) (0.0116) 
       
HLM 0.0141 -0.00664 -0.00688 0.00837 0.0346 0.00484 
 (0.0181) (0.0132) (0.0152) (0.0150) (0.0215) (0.0115) 
N 113 94 72 195 138 461 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
In short, not a single one of CF’s original findings is robust to the inclusion of any of a variety 
of ways of controlling for a time term, leading us to conclude that CF’s analysis provides no 
evidence for the effect of response rates on apparent mass polarization in either direction.  
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We cannot draw strong conclusions from this null, however, because the design is 
underpowered after accounting for a linear time term. If CF’s data generating model is correct, 
models including a linear time term would have less than 30% power (see appendix), but if the 
relationship was spurious, we would find false positives more than 95% of the time. In short, these 
data tell us nothing either way about the effect of response rate on polarization. 
Simulating lower ANES response rates 
To test CF’s theory, we instead use individual-level data from the ANES. We simulate lower 
response rates to the ANES by using paradata on fieldwork effort (the number of calls it took 
before the respondent took part in the survey) to estimate the effect of lower survey response rates 
on estimates of polarization (following the approach of Sturgis et al. (2017)). The logic of this 
simulation is that the hardest to reach respondents would be the least likely to respond if the overall 
response rate was lower. 
For each Presidential election year from 1980 onwards (excluding 2012 where the paradata is 
missing), we simulate a response rate decline by converting the number of calls variable within each 
survey to a percentile, and dropping respondents above a threshold. The threshold starts at 100 in 
1980 (all respondents) and declines by 10 percentage points at each Presidential election (e.g. 90 in 
1984), reaching 10 in 2016 (the distribution of calls within each survey is skewed, so the proportion 
included in the sample differs from the threshold in some years). This approach simulates a dramatic 
decline in response rates, from 71% in 1980 to 15% in 2016 (see appendix Figure 5). 
We then compare polarization (using CF’s Cohen’s D approach) in the full ANES sample and 
our simulated low response rate sample using the six questions CF use in their descriptive analysis 
(see appendix for question wordings) in Figure 2. If declining response rates exaggerated mass 
polarization, we would expect to see the simulated low response rate sample become more polarized 
than the actual ANES sample. Instead, the two lines are remarkably similar, with entirely 
10 
  
overlapping confidence intervals in every case. In short, the analysis provides no evidence to suggest 
declining response rates would have inflated our estimates of mass polarization in the ANES. 
 
Figure 2. Polarization in the full and simulated response rate decline sample ANES 1980-2016 
 
Conclusions 
The extent to which the American public has polarized is an important question. Survey 
nonresponse bias is a serious threat to statistical inference. However, our simulations show that 
falling response rates do not necessarily increase nonresponse bias for variables related to political 
interest such as polarization. CF argue nonresponse bias has inflated levels of mass polarization but 
did not account for the fact that both these variables are correlated with time. Accounting for this 
correlation removes the apparent relationship between response rate and polarization. Correctly 
specified models do not have sufficient power to rule out a relationship between response rates and 
polarization. However, we also show an analysis of ANES data that finds no evidence to suggest 
lower response rates would have inflated levels of polarization. In short, we find no evidence for an 
effect of survey response rates on the measurement of mass polarization. 
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i We only consider nonresponse bias for variables linked to political interest such as polarization here. 
ii This theory fits with studies finding that prosocial personality traits such as conscientiousness (Rogelberg et al., 2003; 
Cheng, Zamarro and Orriens, 2016) and agreeableness (Rogelberg et al., 2003; Brüggen and Dholakia, 2010) predict 
higher survey response rates. However, other traits such as loneliness might also be predictive of response at both stages. 
iii Cavari and Freedman also conduct some analysis on the ANES. It shows polarization has increased on all issues 
examined except defense spending and that unit responses rate have declined. There is no modelling of this relationship, 
so it merely constitutes a re-expression of the original question rather than evidence for the relationship between these 
phenomena one way or the other. 
iv CF say this is consistent with their theory because Americans are less knowledgeable about foreign policy. 
v Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of the annual means of each of these variables suggests only civil rights is a 
stationary process. However, the 136 Pew surveys in CF's data only cover 11 years (with no further time granularity 
available) so the ADF test does not have high power to reject the null of non-stationarity, so we see these results as 
indicative rather than conclusive. However, the significant relationship with time when using the survey as the unit of 
analysis is a clear indication of time heterogeneity in the data. 
vi We include mean response rate by year to guarantee conditional independence of random and fixed effects 
components of the hierarchical linear model (Bafumi and Gelman, 2007), 
vii For reasons of space we only show the results of the coefficient for response rate. 
                                                 
